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EXTREMIST  SPEECH,  COMPELLED  CONFORMITY,
AND  CENSORSHIP  CREEP
Danielle Keats Citron*
Silicon Valley has long been viewed as a full-throated champion of First Amendment values.
The dominant online platforms, however, have recently adopted speech policies and processes that
depart from the U.S. model.  In an agreement with the European Commission, the dominant tech
companies have pledged to respond to reports of hate speech within twenty-four hours, a hasty
process that may trade valuable expression for speedy results.  Plans have been announced for an
industry database that will allow the same companies to share hashed images of banned extremist
content for review and removal elsewhere.
These changes are less the result of voluntary market choices than of a bowing to governmen-
tal pressure.  Companies’ policies about extremist content have been altered to stave off threatened
European regulation.  Far more than illegal hate speech or violent terrorist imagery is in EU
lawmakers’ sights, so too is online radicalization and “fake news.”  Newsworthy content and
political criticism may end up being removed along with terrorist beheading videos, “kill lists” of
U.S. servicemen, and instructions on how to bomb houses of worship.
The impact of extralegal coercion will be far reaching.  Unlike national laws that are limited
by geographic borders, terms-of-service agreements apply to platforms’ services on a global scale.
Whereas local courts can order platforms only to block material viewed in their jurisdictions, a
blacklist database raises the risk of global censorship.  Companies should counter the serious
© 2018 Danielle Keats Citron.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Morton & Sophia Macht Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King
Carey School of Law; Affiliate, Stanford Center on Internet & Society, Yale Information
Society Project.  I am grateful to Leslie Henry, Sarah Hoyle, Margot Kaminski, Kate
Klonick, Emma Llanso´, and James Weinstein for closely reading drafts, and to Tabatha Abu
El-Haj, Jack Balkin, Susan Brison, Ryan Calo, Chapin Cimino, Will Duffield, Ed Felten,
James Fleming, Brett Frischmann, Mike Godwin, Abner Greene, Anil Kalhan, Daphne
Keller, Paula Kift, Michael Nelson, Megan Phelps-Roper, Neil Richards, Flemming Rose,
Marc Rotenberg, John Samples, Alexander Tsesis, and Benjamin Wittes for advice.
Participants in the Fordham Law Review’s “Terrorist Incitement on the Internet”
symposium, Twitter’s Trust and Safety Summit, Drexel Law School’s Faculty workshop, the
Cato Institute’s “The Future of the First Amendment” conference, and the Yale
Information Society Project’s Lunchtime Talk Series provided helpful feedback.  Thanks to
Emily Bryant and Ian Ko¨nigsdo¨rffer for superb research assistance.  I owe a debt of
gratitude to Susan McCarty for her expert editing, Frank Lancaster for assisting in all
things, and Dean Donald Tobin for supporting this research.  Special thanks to the editors
of the Notre Dame Law Review, especially Shannon Lewry, for their insight, help, and
patience.
1035
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 2  1-MAR-18 12:38
1036 notre dame law review [vol. 93:3
potential for censorship creep with definitional clarity, robust accountability, detailed trans-
parency, and ombudsman oversight.
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman squared off with internet com-
panies and lost.  The dispute concerned the Senator’s demand that platforms
remove hundreds of Al-Qaeda training videos.1  Senator Lieberman argued
that by keeping up the videos, tech companies were complicit in terrorist
recruitment.2
Google’s YouTube held fast in defense of users’ right to express unpopu-
lar viewpoints.3  As Jeffrey Rosen wrote at the time, Google’s Nicole Wong
and her colleagues worked “impressively to put the company’s long-term
commitment to free expression above its short-term financial interests.”4
Ignoring the Senator’s demands was a safe strategy: any effort to proscribe
extremist expression would likely fail given the First Amendment’s hostility to
viewpoint-based regulations.5
American free speech values guided policy decisions in Silicon Valley
long after the showdown with Senator Lieberman.6  Social media companies
routinely looked to First Amendment doctrine in crafting speech policies.7
1 Lieberman to YouTube: Remove al Qaeda Videos, CNN (May 20, 2008), http://edition
.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/05/20/youtube.lieberman/.
2 Timothy B. Lee, YouTube Rebuffs Senator’s Demands to Remove Islamist Videos, ARS
TECHNICA (May 20, 2008), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2008/05/youtube-rebuffs-
senatorss-demands-for-removal-of-islamist-videos/.
3 Id. Ultimately, YouTube took down eighty videos under its terms of service, but
many others were left up—to the Senator’s dismay.  Editorial, Joe Lieberman, Would-Be Cen-
sor, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/opinion/25sun
1.html.
4 Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 30, 2008), http://www.ny
times.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30google-t.html.
5 Calls for violence or political disruption generally enjoy First Amendment protec-
tion—any regulation of such speech would have to overcome the crucible of strict scrutiny.
Alexander Tsesis, Essay, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651 (2017) (argu-
ing that certain forms of terrorist speech can be regulated without running afoul of free
speech norms).  Incitement to violence can, however, be regulated in the narrow circum-
stance that violence is intended, likely, and imminent. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam).
6 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 232 (2014); Kate Klonick, The
New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 27–28).
7 Klonick, supra note 6, at 26–28.  Tech companies have enormous freedom to R
choose whether and how to address extremist expression.  As private actors, online plat-
forms operate free from First Amendment concerns.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digi-
tal Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1439 (2011).  Under section 230
of the Communications Decency Act, tech companies enjoy broad immunity from liability
related to user-generated content.  Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet
Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017).
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Twitter, an exemplar of this ethos, was aptly known as “the free speech wing
of the free speech party.”8
From the start, tech companies’ commitment to free expression admit-
ted some exceptions.9  Terms of service and community guidelines banned
child pornography, spam, phishing, fraud, impersonation, and copyright vio-
lations.10  Threats, cyber stalking, nonconsensual pornography, and hate
speech were prohibited after extended discussions with advocacy groups.11
The goal was to strike an appropriate balance between free expression and
abuse prevention while preserving platforms’ market share.12
More recently, social media companies have revised their speech policies
concerning extremist and hateful expression.  Unlike previous changes, how-
ever, these revisions were not the result of market forces.  They were not
made to accommodate the wishes of advertisers and advocates.13  Instead,
they were adopted to stave off threatened European regulation.  After terror-
ist attacks in Paris and Brussels in late 2015, European regulators excoriated
tech companies for failing to combat terrorist recruitment on their plat-
forms.14  Their message was clear: online platforms would face onerous civil
8 Josh Halliday, Twitter’s Tony Wang: “We Are the Free Speech Wing of the Free Speech Party,”
GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/twitter-
tony-wang-free-speech.
9 Citron, supra note 6, at 232.
10 Twitter largely embraced this approach until 2016. See, e.g., The Twitter Rules, TWIT-
TER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311# (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
11 Citron, supra note 6, at 229–30; Jessica Guynn, Twitter to Police Abuse in Major Shift,
USA TODAY (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/03/01/twit
ter-to-police-abuse-in-major-shift/98559482/.  For the past eight years, I have been advising
social media companies on speech and safety issues.  I am a member of Twitter’s Trust and
Safety Council and part of a small group advising Facebook on its nonconsensual pornog-
raphy policies.  I do not receive compensation for my work with Twitter and Facebook (or
any other company that I advise).  I serve as an adviser to the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative,
an organization whose work has been instrumental in changing companies’ policies
related to nonconsensual pornography, see Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A
View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), as well as a member of the
newly formed Advisory Board for the Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Technology and
Society and the Anti-Cyber Hate Working Group established by the Anti-Defamation
League.  Although this Article is informed by that work, it is not based on any confidential
information shared with me.
12 Mathew Ingram, Twitter Tries to Find a Balance Between Promoting Free Speech and Curb-
ing Abuse, FORTUNE (July 20, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/20/twitter-bans-troll-
milo-yiannopolous/.
13 Sapna Maheshwari & Daisuke Wakabayashi, AT&T and Johnson & Johnson Pull Ads
from YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/business
/atampt-and-johnson-amp-johnson-pull-ads-from-youtube-amid-hate-speech-concerns.
html.
14 Liat Clark, Facebook and Twitter Must Tackle Hate Speech or Face New Laws, WIRED UK
(Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/us-tech-giants-must-tackle-hate-speech-or-
face-legal-action.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 4  1-MAR-18 12:38
1038 notre dame law review [vol. 93:3
and criminal penalties unless their policies and processes resulted in the
rapid removal of extremist speech.15
Tech companies accommodated these demands because regulation of
extremist speech was a real possibility.  Unlike in the United States, in the
European Union, there isn’t a heavy presumption against speech restric-
tions.16  On May 31, 2016, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube
entered into an agreement with the European Commission to remove “hate-
ful” speech within twenty-four hours if appropriate under terms of service.17
Six months later, the same companies announced plans for a shared
database of banned extremist content for review and removal elsewhere.18
Nearly a decade later, European lawmakers accomplished what Senator
Lieberman could not.19  By insisting upon changes to platforms’ speech rules
and practices, EU regulators have exerted their will across the globe.  Unlike
national laws that apply only within a country’s borders, terms of service
apply wherever platforms are accessed.20  Similarly, whereas local courts can
only order platforms to block material accessed in their jurisdiction, the
industry database has the potential to result in worldwide censorship.
15 Mark Scott, Europe Presses American Tech Companies to Tackle Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/technology/europe-hate-speech-
facebook-google-twitter.html; Amar Toor, UK Lawmakers Say Facebook, Google, and Twitter Are
‘Consciously Failing’ to Fight ISIS Online, VERGE (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/
2016/8/26/12656328/facebook-google-twitter-isis-propaganda-uk-report.
16 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows states to
limit freedom of expression under circumstances that satisfy proportionality review.  Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172.
17 Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/fundamental-rights/files/hate_speech_code_of_conduct_en.pdf.
18 Casey Newton, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube Are Creating a Database of “Ter-
rorist Content,” VERGE (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/12/5/13849570/
facebook-microsoft-twitter-google-terrorist-content-database.
19 Unlike in the EU, in the United States, threatening to regulate protected speech
implicates the protections of the First Amendment. See Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518,
525 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Threatening penalties for future speech goes by the name ‘prior
restraint,’ and a prior restraint is the quintessential first-amendment violation.”).  For
instance, the Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, wrote letters to credit card companies
demanding that they prohibit advertisers from using cards to purchase advertisements on
Backpage.com since ads might be used for illegal sex-related products or services.
Backpage responded by seeking a preliminary injunction against the Sheriff for violating
its First Amendment rights. See Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 230 (7th Cir.
2015).  The court held that the Sheriff had irreparably harmed the site by threatening
coercive state action against credit card companies for facilitating speech on the site. Id. at
239.  The court directed the trial court to issue a temporary injunction ordering the Sheriff
to “take no actions, formal or informal, to coerce or threaten credit card companies,
processors, financial institutions, or other third parties with sanctions intended to ban
credit card or other financial services from being provided to Backpage.com.” Id.
20 Klonick, supra note 6, at 51. R
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All of this might enjoy some justification if EU regulators focused their
efforts on speech proscribed in their countries.21  But this has not been the
case.  Calls to remove hate speech have quickly ballooned to cover expression
that does not violate existing European law, including “online radicalization”
and “fake news.”22  EU officials have pressed a view of hate speech that can
be extended to political dissent and newsworthy developments.  At risk is cen-
sorship creep on a global scale.
Scholarship has explored how formal legal requirements and informal
government pressure can result in collateral censorship, the silencing of pri-
vate actors by other private actors.23  Free speech scholar and Yale Informa-
tion Society Project founder Jack Balkin recently warned:
Currently the Internet is mostly governed by the values of the least censori-
ous regime—that of the United States.  If nation states can enforce global
filtering, blocking, and delinking, the Internet will eventually be governed
21 I say “some justification” deliberately.  European countries have a far different
approach to free expression than the United States. See FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT xvii, 39, 41–43 (2017).  As James Weinstein put it to me, the EU does not
really even have a concept of protected speech.
22 Cara McGoogan, EU Accuses Facebook and Twitter of Failing to Remove Hate Speech, TELE-
GRAPH (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/12/05/eu-accuses-
facebook-twitter-failing-remove-hate-speech/.  In late 2017, Germany passed a law levying
steep fines for companies’ failure to remove hateful conduct and “fake news” within
twenty-four hours. See infra note 88 (discussing the law).  It is, however, unclear if the R
statute applies to “fake news” outside the realm of hateful ideas targeted at protected
groups. Id.
23 Michael Meyerson coined the phrase “collateral censorship.”  Michael I. Meyerson,
Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the “Speaker” Within the New Media, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 118 (1995).  Collateral censorship involves state action because
the “government has created incentives for private parties to censor each other.”  J.M.
Balkin, Essay, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2299 (1999).
For scholarship exploring collateral censorship resulting from both formal and informal
government action, see, for example, REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED:
THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM xxii (2012); Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/
New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2298, 2303–11 (2014) (exploring the
difference between old-school speech regulations involving ex ante laws and new-school
techniques involving ex post efforts short of threats of legal intervention, such as urging
companies to stop doing business with private actors); Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s
Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863 (2012) (arguing that hard censorship is preferable to
opaque and unaccountable efforts at censorship, such as government’s use of unrelated
laws as a pretext to block material, payment for filtered access, and ad hoc efforts to per-
suade intermediaries to restrict content); Seth F Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First
Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11
(2006) (contending that enforcement of copyright, material support, and other laws
against intermediaries facilitates censorship by proxy); Christina Mulligan, Technological
Intermediaries and Freedom of the Press, 66 SMU L. REV. 157 (2013) (arguing that collateral
censorship threatens the freedom of the press); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the
Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011).
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by the most censorious regime.  This will undermine the global public good
of a free Internet.24
The assault on the “global public good of a free Internet” is already
underway.  As this Article shows, digital expression is conforming to EU
speech norms with extremist and hateful speech as catalysts.
This Article has three parts.  Part I exposes the pressure facing technol-
ogy companies to tailor their speech policies to EU norms.  As Part I shows,
Silicon Valley’s recent retreat from a strong commitment to free speech has
more to do with compulsion than choice.  Part II explores the fallout, high-
lighting the risk of censorship creep on a global scale.  Part III offers safe-
guards designed to contain extralegal pressure for the good of free
expression.
I. THE EU’S POWER OVER PRIVATE SPEECH RULES
After a spate of deadly terror attacks and hate crimes in 2015, European
lawmakers told social media companies that they were partly to blame for the
violence.25  In their view, online platforms had enabled violent extremists by
giving them access to potential recruits.26  European lawmakers warned com-
panies that they would face onerous criminal and civil penalties unless online
extremism was eliminated.27
After the Charlie Hebdo attack, French President Franc¸ois Hollande
called for legislation that would make social media platforms criminally liable
for users’ “extremist” content.28  French Interior Minister Bernard
Cazeneuve followed that warning with meetings in Silicon Valley.29  Discus-
sions with tech executives bore some fruit: several companies agreed to con-
tinue removing terror-related content.30  As this Part explores, this was just
the start of Silicon Valley’s concessions to European regulators.
24 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at
60–61).
25 See Lizzie Plaugic, France Wants to Make Google and Facebook Accountable for Hate Speech,
VERGE (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/1/27/7921463/google-facebook-
accountable-for-hate-speech-france.
26 See Clark, supra note 14.
27 Plaugic, supra note 25. R
28 Id.
29 Scott Higham & Ellen Nakashima, Why the Islamic State Leaves Tech Companies Torn
Between Free Speech and Security, WASH. POST (July 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/islamic-states-embrace-of-social-media-puts-tech-companies-
in-a-bind/2015/07/15/0e5624c4-169c-11e5-89f3-61410da94eb1_story.html.
30 Id.
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A. Code of Conduct
On December 3, 2015, the European Commission31 established the
European Internet Forum (the “Forum”).32  The goal was the development
of “a joint, voluntary approach” for the detection and removal of “online
terrorist incitement and hate speech.”33  Participants included European
officials, Europol, and tech companies Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and
YouTube (“Tech Companies”).  The European Commissioner for Migration,
Home Affairs, and Citizenship remarked:
Terrorists are abusing the internet to spread their poisonous propa-
ganda: that needs to stop.  The voluntary partnership we launch today with
the internet industry [aims] to address this problem.  We want swift results.
This is a new way to tackle this extremist abuse of the internet, and it will
provide the platform for expert knowledge to be shared, [and] for quick
and operational conclusions to be developed . . . .34
The Forum produced results in short order.  On May 31, 2016, the Euro-
pean Commission announced an agreement with the Tech Companies enti-
tled “Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online” (“hate-
speech agreement” or “the Code”).35  The Tech Companies agreed to pro-
hibit “hateful conduct,” defined as speech inciting violence or hatred against
protected groups.36  Reports of hate speech would be reviewed within twenty-
31 The European Commission, which represents the common EU interest, is the EU’s
executive arm.  Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012).  It
“ensures that the regulations and directives adopted by the Council [of the European
Union] and the Parliament are implemented in the member states.” Id.
32 EUROPEAN COMM’N, A EUROPEAN AGENDA ON SECURITY: STATE OF PLAY: DECEMBER
2016 (Dec. 21, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-security/fact-sheets/docs/20161221/european_agenda_on
_security_state_of_play_21122016_en.pdf.
33 European Commission Press Release IP/15/6243, EU Internet Forum: Bringing
Together Governments, Europol and Technology Companies to Counter Terrorist Con-
tent and Hate Speech Online (Dec. 3, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
6243_en.htm.
34 Id.
35 Clark, supra note 14.  Although civil society organizations participated in early meet-
ings held by the European Internet Forum, they were excluded from the negotiations that
resulted in the Code. EDRi and Access Now Withdraw from the EU Commission IT Forum Discus-
sions, EDRI (May 31, 2016), https://edri.org/edri-access-now-withdraw-eu-commission-
forum-discussions.  As the civil society group European Digital Rights (“EDRi”) explained,
the European Commission refused to give the groups access to the negotiations and drafts
of the agreement.  Maryant Ferna´ndez Pe´rez, New Documents Reveal the Truth Behind the Hate
Speech Code, EDRI (Sept. 7, 2016), https://edri.org/new-documents-reveal-truth-behind-
hate-speech-code.
36 European Commission Press Release IP/16/1937, European Commission and IT
Companies Announce Code of Conduct on Illegal Online Hate Speech (May 31, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm.  That definition was drawn
from the 2008 European Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA. Id.
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four hours and removed if the speech violated companies’ terms of service.37
The European Commission made clear that it would conduct periodic
reviews of the Tech Companies’ compliance with the hate-speech agree-
ment.38  The European Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender
Equality Vera Jourova´ hailed the hate-speech agreement as essential to com-
bating the use of social media to “radicalize young people and to spread vio-
lence and hatred.”39
In December 2016, the European Commission issued its first assessment
of the Tech Companies’ handling of hate-speech reports, and the feedback
was not positive.  Over a six-week period, twelve organizations, working on
behalf of the Commission, reported alleged incidents of hate speech and
tracked the companies’ response.40  The European Commission criticized
the Tech Companies’ “success rate”—the number of requests resulting in
removal—and timeliness.41  Only forty percent of hate-speech reports were
reviewed in twenty-four hours, and twenty-eight percent of speech reported
as hateful conduct was removed.42
In the estimation of the European Commission, the Tech Companies
had fallen short on their commitments.  Jourova´ warned that if the Tech
Companies “want to convince me and the ministers that the non-legislative
approach can work, they will have to act quickly and make a strong effort in
the coming months.”43  In other words, more hateful speech needed to be
removed, and faster, or else.44
B. Blacklist Database
EU authorities have been in contact with social media companies about
terrorist groups’ use of their services for the past seven years.45  For years, the
contact proceeded on an ad hoc basis with law enforcement asking compa-
37 Under the Code, the Tech Companies would review reports of alleged hate speech
on the basis of their terms of service and only where necessary on the basis of law.  It is
unclear if the Tech Companies would look to the law to determine whether hate speech
should be removed.  Ferna´ndez Pe´rez, supra note 35.
38 Id.
39 Amar Toor, Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Microsoft Agree to EU Hate Speech Rules, VERGE
(May 31, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/5/31/11817540/facebook-twitter-google-
microsoft-hate-speech-europe.
40 EUROPEAN COMM’N, CODE OF CONDUCT ON COUNTERING ILLEGAL HATE SPEECH
ONLINE: FIRST RESULTS ON IMPLEMENTATION 1 (Dec. 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/informa
tion_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-50/factsheet-code-conduct-8_40573.pdf.
41 Id. at 3–4.
42 Id. at 4.
43 Clark, supra note 14.
44 Id.
45 Jason Murdock, Isis: UK Cyber Cops Ramp up Campaign to Curb the Spread of Daesh-
Inspired Propaganda, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-uk-
cyber-cops-ramp-campaign-curb-spread-daesh-inspired-propaganda-1555463.
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nies to take down content.46  The United Kingdom established a Counter
Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) to identify and report “violent
and nonviolent extremism” to online platforms.47  From 2010 to 2015,
CTIRU secured the removal of 249,091 pieces of terrorist-related content.48
According to UK officials, CTIRU had no need to file formal notice and take-
down requests because tech companies were so cooperative.49
Given the success of the CTIRU’s efforts, Europol established its
Internet Referral Unit, described as a “partnership[ ] with the private sector
(to promote ‘self-regulation’ by online service providers).”50  Ninety-one per-
cent of the content reported has been removed.51  Europol has described the
private sector’s compliance with their removal requests as “voluntary.”52
In late 2015, social media companies faced growing pressure to systema-
tize the removal process.53  Extremist content needed to be removed faster
and, if possible, before ever appearing online.  One suggestion was the adop-
tion of an industry database enabling the detection of banned violent terror-
ist images, audio, and video files.54  The database would collect hashes—or
46 Susan Benesch & Rebecca MacKinnon, The Innocence of YouTube, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Oct. 5, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/05/the-innocence-of-youtube/.
47 Scott Craig & Emma Llanso´, Pressuring Platforms to Censor Content Is Wrong Approach to
Combatting Terrorism, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 5, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/
pressuring-platforms-to-censor-content-is-wrong-approach-to-combatting-terrorism/.
48 CTIRU Statistics at a Glance, 250,000th Piece of Online Extremist/Terrorist Material to Be
Removed, METRO. POLICE (Dec. 23, 2016), http://news.met.police.uk/news/250000th-
piece-of-online-extremist-slash-terrorist-material-to-be-removed-208698; see also Murdock,
supra note 45.  YouTube has granted UK security officials special powers as “super flaggers”
of content that violates its terms of service to ensure that extremist content is instantly
removed.  Sam Jones, UK Security Services Face Rise of Extremist Content Online, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/a0266d5e-489e-11e4-9d04-00144feab7de.
49 See 747 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2013) col. 47 (UK).  Police can demand the removal
of content that incites or glorifies terrorist acts under the UK’s Terrorism Act of 2006.
Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 21 (UK).  If companies fail to remove terrorist content, they
can be charged with encouraging terrorism. Id. § 1.
50 EUROPOL, EU INTERNET REFERRAL UNIT: YEAR ONE REPORT 3, https://www.europol.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/eu_iru_1_year_report_highlights.pdf.
51 Jennifer Baker, Europol’s Online Censorship Unit Is Haphazard and Unaccountable Says
NGO, ARS TECHNICA (July 4, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/07/europol
-iru-extremist-content-censorship-policing/.  Although Europol established the Internet
Referral Unit in the spring of 2015, it was officially sanctioned via regulation in May 2016.
Id.; see also Press Release, Europol, Europol’s Internet Referral Unit to Combat Terrorist
and Violent Extremist Propaganda (July 1, 2015), https://www.europol.europa.eu/news-
room/news/europol%E2%80%99s-internet-referral-unit-to-combat-terrorist-and-violent-
extremist-propaganda.
52 Baker, supra note 51.
53 Diane Rehm: Growing Pressure on Social Media Sites to Monitor and Remove Terrorist Con-
tent, AM. UNIV. RADIO (Dec. 8, 2015), https://dianerehm.org/shows/2015-12-08/growing-
pressure-on-social-media-sites-to-monitor-and-remove-terrorist-content.
54 Kaveh Waddell, A Tool to Delete Beheading Videos Before They Even Appear Online, ATLAN-
TIC (June 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/06/a-tool-to-
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unique digital fingerprints—of banned content so it could be instantly flag-
ged and removed.55
Silicon Valley initially rejected the idea.56  Executives expressed concern
that valuable content could find its way into the database since there wasn’t
clear consensus about the meaning of “terrorist speech.”57  Another worry
was that governments might try to use the database to silence critics.58
Six months later, the Tech Companies reversed course and announced
plans for an industry database to help prevent the spread of “violent terrorist
imagery.”59  In a press release, the Tech Companies noted that other plat-
forms would be welcome to participate as soon as the database was up and
running.60  The European Commission hailed the database as the next logi-
cal step in a public-private partnership to combat extremism.61  In its view,
the database was “a significant step forward in the form of a collaborative
delete-beheading-videos-before-they-even-appear-online/488105/.  The suggestion drew
inspiration from the Microsoft system used to detect and remove child pornography. Id.
55 Ellen Nakashima, There’s a New Tool to Take Down Terrorism Images Online. But Social-
Media Companies Are Wary of It, WASH. POST (June 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/new-tool-to-take-down-terrorism-images-online-spurs-debate-
on-what-constitutes-extremist-content/2016/06/20/0ca4f73a-3492-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b1
2_story.html?utm_term=.28394b560bb2; see also Jamie Condliffe, Facebook and Google May Be
Fighting Terrorist Videos with Algorithms, MIT TECH. REV. (June 27, 2016), https://www.tech
nologyreview.com/s/601778/facebook-and-google-may-be-fighting-terrorist-videos-with-
algorithms/ (“[Hashing] is a mathematical operation that takes a long stream of data of
arbitrary length, like a video clip or string of DNA, and assigns it a specific value of a fixed
length, known as a hash.  The same files or DNA strings will be given the same hash,
allowing computers to quickly and easily spot duplicates.”).
56 Nakashima, supra note 55. R
57 Id. There was, however, some support for the effort when the idea was initially
discussed with tech companies.  Microsoft, for instance, announced that it was “providing
funding and technical support to Dartmouth College computer scientist Hany Farid,” who
worked with Microsoft to develop PhotoDNA (which hashes images of child pornography),
to “develop a technology to help stakeholders identify copies of patently terrorist content.”
Reuters, Google, Facebook Quietly Move Toward Automatic Blocking of Extremist Videos, FORTUNE
(June 26, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/26/google-fb-block-extremist-videos/.
58 Nakashima, supra note 55. R
59 Partnering to Help Curb Spread of Online Terrorist Content, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec.
5, 2016), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/partnering-to-help-curb-spread-of-
online-terrorist-content/; see also Sarah Perez, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube Col-
laborate to Remove “Terrorist Content” from Their Services, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 5, 2016), https://
techcrunch.com/2016/12/05/facebook-microsoft-twitter-and-youtube-collaborate-to-
remove-terrorist-content-from-their-services/.  The Tech Companies made this announce-
ment the day before the European Commission released its critical report demanding
stronger action against hate speech.  Scott, supra note 15.
60 Glyn Moody, Internet Giants Will Join Forces to Stop Online Sharing of Terrorist Material,
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 6, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/12/twitter-face
book-microsoft-youtube-terrorist-material-removal/.
61 European Commission Press Release IP/16/4328, EU Internet Forum: A Major
Step Forward in Curbing Terrorist Content on the Internet (Dec. 8, 2016), http://eur
opa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4328_en.htm.
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industry response in protecting their users from terrorist content.”62  Google
similarly noted its hope that the collaboration would “lead to greater effi-
ciency as we continue to enforce our policies to help curb the pressing global
issue of terrorist content online.”63
The Tech Companies, however, did issue some guidelines.64  The
database would share hashes of “the most extreme and egregious terrorist
images and videos . . . content most likely to violate all of our respective
companies’ content policies.”65  Hashed material would not be immediately
deleted from participants’ sites.66  Instead, each company would review con-
tent included in the database under its own policies.67  The Tech Companies
acknowledged the importance of clear guidelines to ensure that the industry
database would not be used to censor public discourse.68
C. More Coercion than Choice
European laws have influenced policy all over the globe, often in ways
that strengthen legal regulation.69  Most obviously, the EU supplies global
standards when foreign regulations mimic its strict rules.  The EU’s influence
is also felt when companies adopt its strict standards as a result of market
forces.70  In what has been called the “Brussels Effect,” companies follow EU
laws in their global operations because it allows them to operate simultane-
ously in the world’s largest internal market and in jurisdictions with more lax
standards.71  In areas like data privacy and antitrust, companies have con-
62 Id.
63 Scott Shackford, How Long Before This Tool to Censor Images from Terrorists Gets Mis-
used?, REASON (Dec. 6, 2016), http://reason.com/blog/2016/12/06/how-long-before-this-
tool-to-censor-imag.
64 Partnering to Help Curb Spread of Online Terrorist Content, supra note 59. R
65 Liat Clark, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, YouTube Launch Shared Terrorist Media Database,
WIRED UK (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/facebook-twitter-microsoft-you-
tube-launch-shared-terrorism-database.
66 Id.
67 Id. It is unclear from the announcement whether participants in the database
would provide a way for users to challenge inclusion of their content in the hash database.
Also, because the database enforces TOS violations, it would likely result in worldwide
blocking of hashed material, as is commonly true of other TOS violations. See, e.g., User
Content and Conduct Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en_us/+/policy/con
tent.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
68 Moody, supra note 60. R
69 See Bradford, supra note 31 (exploring the dynamics of Vogel’s California Effect in a R
global context).  David Vogel documented the role that California laws had on other states
in much the same manner. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259–60 (1995).  I explored the California Effect in my
work on the privacy policymaking of state attorneys general. See Danielle Keats Citron, The
Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016).
70 Bradford, supra note 31, at 6. R
71 Id. (explaining that the Brussels Effect is most likely to occur when EU regulation
governs policy areas of low elasticity).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 12  1-MAR-18 12:38
1046 notre dame law review [vol. 93:3
formed their global operations to more restrictive European standards to
avoid the expense of piecemeal compliance.72
Market forces, however, do not explain Silicon Valley’s recent adoption
of EU speech norms related to extremist speech.  The Tech Companies did
not change their speech policies and practices for efficiency’s sake.  They
were not trying to attract advertising fees or advocates’ approval.  They were
responding to government threats, not voluntarily making changes to their
policies.
Tech companies yielded to European regulators’ demands because they
knew their threats were not idle.  In the European Union, unlike in the
United States, there isn’t a heavy presumption against speech restrictions.73
Hate speech and extremist expression were already banned in some EU
member states.74  Social media providers knew that if onerous laws were
72 Id. at 18.  As Paul Schwartz insightfully explains, the trend is towards the harmoniza-
tion of EU-U.S. privacy policies, most recently with the Privacy Shield.  Paul M. Schwartz,
The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966
(2013).  Continued harmonization is not assured if the Trump administration calls into
question the deal struck in the Privacy Shield. See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer,
Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115 (2017).  If that is the case, we shall see an
upward regulatory trajectory along the lines of the Brussels Effect: global companies will
likely endeavor to comply with the EU’s strict General Data Protection Rule, which goes
into effect in May 2018.
73 In the EU, laws penalizing speech must satisfy a proportionality analysis. Report from
the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, (Mar. 15, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/subsidiarity_reports_en.htm.  Under
Article 20 of the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, “incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence” on the basis of “national, racial or religious hatred” is prohibited.
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 20 (Dec. 16, 1966).
74 A number of EU member states outlaw hate speech and Holocaust denial.  Leonid
Bershidsky, Opinion, Europe Gets U.S. Tech Leaders to Self-Censor, BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 31,
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-05-31/europe-gets-u-s-tech-lead-
ers-to-self-censor.  In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the conviction of
a member of the Belgian Parliament for inciting racial discrimination by distributing leaf-
lets calling for a “Belgians and Europeans First” policy and saying, “Stand Up against the
Islamification of Belgium.”  Abrams, supra note 21, at 42. R
Similar efforts to regulate hate speech in the United States would surely fail given
strict scrutiny review of viewpoint-based speech regulations. Id. at xvii, 39–40 (exploring
American approach to free speech in which statements, whatever their offense to groups,
are routinely protected from viewpoint-based regulation, such as hate speech bans); see also
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 455, 458 (2011) (vacating judgment for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress resulting from protestors’ bigoted messages because such com-
mentary amounted to “speech on a matter of public concern” and could not be penalized
“simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 146 (1983))).  That is why U.S. officials have proceeded with a light touch in their
efforts to influence Silicon Valley’s decisions about extremist speech.  After the pipe bomb
explosions in New York and New Jersey in 2016, President Obama urged tech companies to
help “to push back against online extremist content and all messages of hate.”  Press
Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the
Explosions in New York City and New Jersey (Sept. 19, 2016).  That message came with an
explicit recognition that the White House was not considering legal intervention.  As the
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passed and enforced, hosting user-generated content would be prohibitively
expensive.  No matter how often EU lawmakers describe the recent changes
to private speech practices as “voluntary” decisions, they can only be reasona-
bly understood as the product of government coercion.
Comparing the dynamics of earlier changes in companies’ speech poli-
cies to recent developments demonstrates the point.  In interviews conducted
in 2010 and 2011, safety personnel explained that their platforms banned
hate speech because doing so comported with their employers’ sense of cor-
porate social responsibility and the wishes of advertisers and advocacy
groups.75  Facebook, Microsoft’s Xbox Live, and other content hosts adopted
different definitions of hate speech,76 from the narrow (e.g., speech target-
ing marginalized groups with violence) to the broad (e.g., speech that
demeans marginalized groups).77  Corporate hate speech policies were a
reflection of business choices, not government pressure.78
Similarly, changes in the private speech rules around nonconsensual
pornography were a reflection of market forces.  As early as 2011, advocacy
groups were pressing platforms to change their rules regarding the posting
of nude images without subjects’ consent.79  They argued that nonconsen-
sual pornography was neither good for business nor the result of voluntary
sexual expression.80  Advocates’ only leverage was their ability to rally public
opinion, which could impose modest costs if some users and advertisers
White House Press Secretary recognized, “There are obviously a lot of complicated First
Amendment issues and other things.”  Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Jan. 8, 2016).
75 Citron & Norton, supra note 7, at 1454.  Beginning in 2010, the Anti-Cyber Hate R
Working Group (of which I was a member) brought together tech companies, advocates,
and academics to discuss best practices regarding hate speech. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete
Squad, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 29, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-
speech-internet-silicon-valley-making-rules (describing the Anti-Cyber Hate Working
Group’s meetings and efforts).
76 Alexandra Burlacu, Microsoft Tackles Online Hate Speech with New Tools and Resources to
Combat Abuse, TECH TIMES (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/175274/20
160827/microsoft-tackles-online-hate-speech-with-new-tools-and-resources-to-combat-abuse
.htm; Brian Heater, What Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Others Are Doing to Tackle Hate Speech,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 15, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/15/what-facebook-twit
ter-youtube-and-others-are-doing-to-tackle-hate-speech/.
77 Citron & Norton, supra note 7, at 1468 n.185.  Until 2016, Twitter refused to ban
hate speech because it feared censoring such a broad category of expression.  Kate Benner,
Twitter Adds New Ways to Curb Abuse and Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/technology/twitter-adds-new-ways-to-curb-abuse-and-hate-
speech.html?_r=0.
78 Citron & Norton, supra note 7, at 1453–54.
79 Danielle Keats Citron, Online Engagement on Equal Terms, B.U. L. REV. ANNEX (Oct.
19, 2015), https://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/citron-online-engagement-on-equal-terms/
(discussing Twitter and other platforms’ changes to speech rules to ban nonconsensual
pornography).
80 See generally CITRON, supra note 6; see also Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne
Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014); Franks, supra note
11, at 10–11.
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exited their platforms.  After prominent individuals decried the nonconsen-
sual posting of their nude images and popular media outlets criticized com-
panies’ inattention to the problem in 2014, the major online platforms
overhauled their policies to ban the practice.81  To be sure, advocacy groups
had the ability to rally public support behind the notion that companies
should ban nonconsensual pornography.  But, unlike governments, they had
neither the leverage nor the power to make it prohibitively expensive for
companies to ignore their advocacy.82  That is why it took considerable
time—and crucially, market pressure—for platforms to change their posi-
tions on nonconsensual pornography.
By contrast, when the Tech Companies changed their speech policies
and procedures regarding hateful and extremist material in 2016, they did so
in the shadow of threatened regulation.83  In what was surely timed to lessen
the blow of the European Commission’s critical review of their compliance
with the hate-speech agreement, the Tech Companies released their
announcement about the industry database the day before the European
Commission released its report.84  As Eve Peyser has observed, the industry
database was surely the “quick and strong effort the EU asked for.”85  EU
regulators wielded their power to impose material costs on extremist speech
to pressure conformity with their speech norms.
The demands of European leaders have only escalated since the
announcement of the hate-speech agreement and the industry database.
After a series of terrorist attacks in London in 2017, British Prime Minister
Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron threatened to fine
tech companies for “fail[ing] to remove ‘extremist’ propaganda from their
platforms.”86  They called upon social media platforms to use automation to
prevent publication, rather than relying on users to flag content for dele-
tion.87  Germany made good on its threats by passing a law sanctioning fines
81 Franks, supra note 11, at 3–6.
82 As discussed above, advocacy groups could not support lawsuits against online plat-
forms for user-generated content given their immunity from liability under Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
83 Gretel Kauffman, EU Urges Social Media Giants to Act on Hate Speech, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2016/1205/EU-urges-
social-media-giants-to-act-on-hate-speech.
84 Scott, supra note 15.  The Tech Companies surely had advance knowledge of the
impending report—the press release about the shared database was perhaps meant to
blunt the Commission’s criticism.
85 Eve Peyser, Twitter and Facebook Randomly Crack Down on Terrorist Videos After EU Warn-
ing, GIZMODO (Dec. 5, 2016), http://gizmodo.com/twitter-and-facebook-decide-to-crack-
down-on-spread-of-1789710389.
86 Amanda Paulson & Eva Botkin-Kowacki, In Terror Fight, Tech Companies Caught
Between US and European Ideals, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 23, 2017), https://www.cs
monitor.com/Technology/2017/0623/In-terror-fight-tech-companies-caught-between-US-
and-European-ideals.
87 Cabinet Office and Home Office, French-British Action Plan: Internet Security,
2017 (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/french-british-action-plan-in
ternet-security.
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up to fifty-seven million euros if companies fail to remove hate speech within
twenty-four hours of its reporting.88
In response, Google announced a four-part plan to address terrorist
propaganda including increased use of technology to identify terrorist-
related videos, hiring additional content moderators, removing advertising
on potentially objectionable videos, and directing potential terrorist recruits
toward counter-radicalization videos.89  Facebook announced its use of artifi-
cial intelligence to stop the spread of terrorist propaganda and hiring of
3000 more people to review speech reported as terms-of-service (TOS) viola-
tions.90  These efforts appear designed to prevent European leaders from
adopting or enforcing legislation that would punish tech companies for fail-
ing to censor extremist content adequately.91
II. CENSORSHIP CREEP
Without question, EU pressure to remove hateful conduct and violent
terrorist content could be beneficial.  Changes in companies’ speech prac-
tices could prevent disenfranchised individuals from seeing Al-Qaeda videos
calling for the death of Jews and then going to synagogues with guns.  The
shared database could facilitate the swift removal of gruesome beheading
videos, preventing their viral spread all over the internet.  It could ensure
that a “kill list” of U.S. soldiers is removed before anyone has a chance to see
it.92  With less terrorist propaganda and less hate speech online,93 there
88 Melissa Eddy & Mark Scott, Delete Hate Speech or Pay up, Germany Tells Social Media
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/business/
germany-facebook-google-twitter.html; Greenberg Traurig LLP, German Government Passes
Disputed Draft of Act Improving Law Enforcement on Social Networks, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 28, 2017),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=D6d06c09-9f8b-43ed-8f2d-761c5199befc;
Oliver Su¨me, Germany: Draft “Network Enforcement Law” to Tackle Hate Speech and Fake News,
Fieldfisher (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.fieldfisher.com/publications/2017/04/germany-
draft-network-enforcement-law-to-tackle-hate-speech-and-fake-news.  The German law also
apparently covers “fake news.” Id.  As Paula Kift explains, the German law “does not define
‘fake news.’  Instead, it suggests that ‘fake news’ [is] indictable only when [it] ‘objectively’
meet[s] any of the elements of the offenses.”  E-mail from Paula Kift to Danielle Citron
(June 3, 2017, 1:43 PM) (on file with author) (translating German law into English and
explaining its meaning).
89 Kent Walker, Four Steps We’re Taking Today to Fight Terrorism Online, Google (June 18,
2017), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/four-steps-were-taking-today-fight-
online-terror/.
90 Monika Bickert & Brian Fishman, Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 15, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-
counter-terrorism/.
91 See Clark, supra note 14; Moody, supra note 60.
92 This example comes from British ISIS operative Sally Jones who used social media
to incite Westerners to violence.  She issued a “kill list” of 100 servicemen and U.S. veterans
via Twitter. Radicalization: Social Media and the Rise of Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 6 (2015) (testimony
of Mark D. Wallace, CEO of the Counter Extremism Project) [hereinafter Radicalization
Social Media].
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might be fewer people joining ISIS fighters in Syria or planting bombs in
shopping markets or houses of worship.94
Although these potential benefits are not in doubt, there are potential
costs as well.  Companies’ TOS policies could be interpreted to prohibit
speech far beyond speech inciting hatred of (or calling for violence against)
vulnerable groups or violent extremist content.  They could result in the
global deletion of a government official’s tweets.95  They could lead to the
worldwide removal of websites criticizing political candidates.96  They could
result in the global suspension of civil rights activists’ Facebook profiles.97
This Part explains how this could happen.  It begins by exploring the
concept of censorship creep.  It exposes the costs of censorship creep, includ-
ing the suppression of legitimate debate and counter speech that might con-
vince people to reject bigotry and terrorist ideology.
A. Concept
The term creep refers to “the idea that a tool designed for one purpose
ends up being used for another one.”98  Tools or programs designed to
accomplish a particular end or to solve a specific problem are gradually
extended to other uses or contexts.99  In the engineering context, the phe-
93 By which I mean hate speech that would likely be adjudicated as illegal under the
laws of EU member states.
94 Evidence has suggested that ISIS adherents who committed atrocities have used
social media to spread terrorist propaganda and justify violence. See Radicalization Social
Media, supra note 92, at 5.
95 This is a riff on the hate speech conviction of a Belgian Parliament member who
distributed leaflets calling for a “Belgians and European First” policy and saying, “Stop the
Sham Immigration Policy, Send non-European sub-seekers home.”  Abrams, supra note 21,
at 42.
96 Laurel Wamsley, Austrian Court Rules Facebook Must Delete Hate Speech, NPR (May 8,
2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/08/527398995/austrian-court-
rules-facebook-must-delete-hate-speech.
97 Facebook temporarily banned a well-known Black Lives Matter activist and journal-
ist, Shaun King, who posted racist messages that he received.  Sam Levin, Facebook Tempora-
rily Blocks Black Lives Matter Activist After He Posts Racist Email, GUARDIAN, (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/12/facebook-blocks-shaun-king-bla
ck-lives-matter.  As Mr. King noted after Facebook restored his service, “SO many of you
have told me that you have had your accounts suspended for FIGHTING BIGOTRY while
the bigots often seem to be able to say whatever the hell they want.”  Shaun King, FACE-
BOOK (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/shaunking/photos/a.799605230078397.
1073741828.799539910084929/1135506076488309/?type=3&theater.  Mr. King’s experi-
ence is not unique. See Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, A White Man Called Her Kids the N-
Word. Facebook Stopped Her from Sharing It, WASH. POST (July 31, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/business/economy/for-facebook-erasing-hate-speech-proves-a-daunting-chal
lenge/2017/07/31/922d9bc6-6e3b-11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html?utm_term=.97d6e
7103703.
98 Brett Frischmann & Evan Selinger, Being Human in the Twenty-First Century
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 29) (on file with author).
99 Id.
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nomenon is called function creep.100  Mission creep is another term captur-
ing this phenomenon.101
Depending on the circumstances, creep can have benefits.  New uses of
general-purpose technologies can produce economic growth, innovation,
and other positive externalities.102  But creep can be costly as well.  It can
have pernicious effects that are so gradual that they elude careful review.
Consider the creep involved in certain surveillance programs.  As Frank
Pasquale and I explored in prior work, fusion centers began as federal-state-
local partnerships to combat terrorism.103  Over time, their mission became
unmoored from their antiterror beginnings to cover all crimes, threats, and
hazards.104  While scant security was gained with the expansion of fusion cen-
ters’ work, it came at a cost, including a loss of individual privacy, chilled
speech, and a redirection of resources away from core intelligence
missions.105
I now turn to the concept of censorship creep, which refers to the
expansion of speech policies beyond their original goals.106  As Paul Bernal
explains, “when you build a censorship system for one purpose, you can be
pretty certain that it will be used for other purposes.”107  Section II.B
explores the troubling potential for censorship creep in private speech pro-
grams adopted under EU pressure.  It explains the reasons for censorship
creep and details its costs to individual freedoms and law enforcement.
B. Causes
Several trends will fuel and exacerbate censorship creep—definitional
ambiguity, global enforcement of companies’ speech rules, and opacity of
private speech practices.108  This Section explores the implications of these
trends.
100 Id.
101 See Mission Creep, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
119999?redirectedFrom=Mission©reep#eid36371891 (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
102 FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 98.
103 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1463–64 (2011) (exploring the problem of
mission creep in the context of fusion centers).
104 See id. at 1463.
105 See id. at 1446.  The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations largely
agreed with this assessment in a report issued in 2012. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTI-
GATIONS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 1
(Oct. 3, 2012), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report_federal-support-for-and-
involvement-in-state-and-local-fusions-centers.
106 See Paulson & Botkin-Kowacki, supra note 86.
107 Paul Bernal, Censorship and Surveillance . . ., PAUL BERNAL’S BLOG (Sept. 25, 2014),
https://paulbernal.wordpress.com/2014/09/25/censorship-and-surveillance/.
108 See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1112
(2003); see also ACCESS NOW, ACCESS NOW POSITION PAPER: A DIGITAL RIGHTS APPROACH TO
PROPOSALS FOR PREVENTING OR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM ONLINE 15 (Nov. 2016),
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/10/CVE-online-10.27.pdf; Jens-
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1. Definitional Ambiguity
Censorship creep happens when speech rules are based on ambiguous
terminology.109  Without clear guidelines and specific examples, vague terms
are vulnerable to revision and expansion.110  Consider the Code’s definition
of “illegal hate speech”: speech inciting violence or hatred against a group or
a member of such a group based on race, religion, national, or ethnic ori-
gin.111  Inciting hatred against a group is an ambiguous concept.  It could be
interpreted to cover speech widely understood as hateful, such as describing
members of a religious group as vermin responsible for crime and disease.
But it could also be understood as covering speech that many would charac-
terize as newsworthy.  Given the term’s ambiguity, incitement of hatred could
extend to criticism of Catholics for covering up priests’ sexual exploitation of
children.112  It could be interpreted as applying to speech challenging
Islamic fundamentalism for its homophobia or suppression of women.113  It
could be extended to speech exposing hatred faced by racial minorities.114
In the context of the hate-speech agreement, censorship creep is not a
theoretical possibility.  It is already happening.  European officials have con-
flated “illegal hate speech” with terrorist content, extremist speech, and
bogus news stories.  In criticizing the Tech Companies’ implementation of
the agreement, the European Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and
Gender Equality pointed to the companies’ failure to remove “online radical-
isation, illegal hate speech [and] fake news.”115  Legitimate debate could eas-
ily fall within that broad characterization of hate speech.116
Henrik Jeppesen, First Report on the EU Hate Speech Code of Conduct Shows Need for Trans-
parency, Judicial Oversight, and Appeals, CDT BLOG (Dec. 12, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/
first-report-eu-hate-speech-code-of-conduct-shows-need-transparency-judicial-oversight-ap
peals/.
109 See Volokh, supra note 108, at 1112.
110 This concern animates the overbreadth doctrine in American constitutional law.
111 European Commission Press Release IP/16/1937, supra note 36.  The Code specifi-
cally refers to the Framework Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of
Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law as the legal basis for its definition of
illegal hate speech. Id. In the review commissioned by the European Commission, the
twelve NGOs reporting alleged hate speech had widely varied views of hate speech—some
NGOs had a removal rate of approximately sixty percent, while others had a removal rate
of five percent. See Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online: First Results on
Implementation, supra note 40, at 4; see also Jeppesen, supra note 108.
112 Cf. Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 125, 126 (Ivan
Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009).
113 Cf. id.
114 See Jan & Dwoskin, supra note 97 (discussing cases where Facebook suspended
accounts or removed speech of users who were sharing anguish over hate speech targeting
them but left up speech and accounts of white supremacists responsible for such hate
speech).
115 McGoogan, supra note 22.
116 See Raman Jit Singh Chima, Beware: Countering “Violent Extremism” Online Risks
Human Rights, ACCESS NOW (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.accessnow.org/beware-countering
-violent-extremism-online-risks-human-rights/.
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That vague definitions of hate speech can be used to suppress legitimate
dissent is a long-standing concern.  In particular, the definition of hate
speech featured in the hate-speech agreement has long been subject to this
critique.  During the drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in the 1940s, the United States (led by Eleanor Roosevelt)
argued that dictators could manipulate the same definition of hate speech to
censor dissent.117
As Roosevelt argued seventy years ago, governments may be tempted to
report political dissent as hate speech in the hopes that companies will
remove it.  Human rights advocate Jacob Mchangama has wondered if tech
companies will be able to resist the “inevitable demands” of states to remove
content they determine to be “‘hateful’ or ‘extremist.’”118  Resistance might
be difficult, especially if a significant portion of the companies’ market share
comes from the countries requesting the removal of speech.119
The industry database raises similar concerns.  The notion of violent ter-
rorist content is vague and thus subject to expansion.  Although the Tech
Companies have pledged to include only the “most extreme and egregious
terrorist images and videos,”120 what constitutes extreme and egregious ter-
rorist content is unclear.  The Tech Companies currently have different defi-
nitions of terrorist content in their terms of service, from “content intended
to recruit for terrorist organizations”121 to “[v]iolent threats (direct or indi-
rect)” to groups of people.122  Without clear parameters about what content
will be included, the industry database is “vulnerable to mission creep.”123
Governments are likely to capitalize on the lack of clarity in the meaning
of terrorist content.  The Tech Companies may face pressure from state
actors to include graphic and violent content of all kinds, not just terrorist
imagery.  Along these lines, a UK Security and Immigration Minister has
argued that platforms should block terrorist content even if it is not illegal
because people do not want to see “unsavoury” material.124  Government
117 See Evelyn Aswad, The Role of U.S. Technology Companies as Enforcers of Europe’s New
Internet Hate Speech Ban, 1 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (2016) (analyzing how
hate speech code of conduct is inconsistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights and the Global Network Initiative).
118 Kauffman, supra note 83.
119 As Margot Kaminski thoughtfully reminded me, the Tech Companies are capable of
pushing back against requests to block specific content.  For instance, Google refused to
take down the Innocence of Muslims video in the United States.  But the vague terms make
it easier for platforms to cave to state pressure and the consequences can be the blocking
or removal of content worldwide. See Benesch & Mackinnon, supra note 46.
120 Perez, supra note 59.
121 Violent or Graphic Content, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
2802008?hl=EN&ref_topic=2803176 (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
122 The Twitter Rules, supra note 10.
123 Emma Llanso´, Takedown Collaboration by Private Companies Creates Troubling Precedent,
CDT BLOG (Dec. 6, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/takedown-collaboration-by-private-compa
nies-creates-troubling-precedent/.
124 Liat Clark, UK Gov Wants ‘Unsavoury’ Web Content Censored, WIRED UK (Mar. 15,
2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/government-web-censorship.
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authorities could suggest inclusion of hashed videos of pornography or politi-
cal protests.125  Although companies are ultimately in charge of the database,
they might include content at a government’s request that otherwise they
would not.
Supporters of the industry database have pointed to the success of
Microsoft’s PhotoDNA, which uses hash technology to remove child pornog-
raphy from the internet.126  The PhotoDNA database, run by the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), has not morphed into
a tool for censorship of other types of material.127  But child pornography is
vastly different from terrorist imagery.  Child pornography is not an ambigu-
ous concept—its features can be easily defined and identified.  The child
pornography hash database is managed by NCMEC, an organization with
expert knowledge and experience in child pornography.128  As Andy Sellars
has explained, child pornography “is really the only place where media is
contraband by its very definition.”129
By contrast, whether content amounts to violent and egregious terrorist
material depends on the overall context, including the message and precise
wording.130  As the ACLU’s Lee Rowland explains, “Algorithms are not good
125 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 555–56 (2004).
126 Waddell, supra note 54.
127 Hany Farid, the computer scientist who worked on Microsoft’s PhotoDNA, worked
with the Counter Extremism Project to develop a hash system for terrorist imagery.  Kate
Knibbs, Extreme Moderation, RINGER (Jan. 17, 2017), https://theringer.com/curbing-terror
ist-social-media-activity-facebook-twitter-google-601ff9684068.  Farid offered the software to
social media companies and was puzzled when they did not want to use it, even though it
would do what the companies were “already doing, faster, cheaper, and more efficiently,
with less errors.” Id.
128 Sarah Jeong, Terror Scanning Database for Social Media Raises More Questions than
Answers, MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 9, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/so
cial-media-terror-scanning-database.
129 Id. In April 2017, Facebook announced its adoption of new tools to address the
problem of nonconsensual pornography.  Alex Hern, Facebook Launching Tools to Tackle
Revenge Porn, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/
apr/05/facebook-tools-revenge-porn.  Facebook will allow users to report intimate photos
posted without consent to “specially trained representatives” from the site’s community
operations team who will review reported images and remove them if they violate
Facebook’s community standards. Id.  Facebook will use photo-matching technologies to
remove images it has already determined were shared without consent and in violation of
its community standards. Id.  The photo-matching technologies will only be used on plat-
forms owned by Facebook.  See Emma Grey Ellis, Facebook’s New Plan May Curb Revenge Porn,
but Won’t Kill It, WIRED (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/facebook-
revenge-porn/.  As I told Wired magazine at the time of the announcement, Facebook
should educate their content moderators about the possibility of censorship creep, so that
the photo-sharing technologies are only applied to nonconsensual pornography.  I serve
on a small team of safety experts advising Facebook on how to ensure that its efforts
squarely address the problem of nonconsensual pornography and do not reach beyond it.
See Antigone Davis, The Facts: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot, FACEBOOK (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/h/non-consensual-intimate-image-pilot-the-facts/.
130 See Waddell, supra note 54.
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at determining context and tone like support or opposition, sarcasm or par-
ody.”131  Unlike child pornography’s clear illegality, violent terrorist speech
may be precisely that, or, on the other hand, it may be news or advocacy
against violent ideologies.132
2. Global Deletion
The recent changes to private speech policies and practices risk turning
deletion into the global default.  How so?  There are two interrelated rea-
sons—first, deletion may become the fallback response for removal requests;
and second, TOS agreements are often applied globally.
To illustrate the likelihood that removal will become automatic, con-
sider the hate-speech code of conduct.  Removal may become the fallback
position on hate speech to forestall criticism and new regulation.133  A pre-
sumption of deletion is certainly cheaper than bearing the costs of new laws.
For this reason, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe warned that
private entities in public-private partnerships will likely exercise “excessive
control” over online content to avoid liability for the transmission of illegal
content.134
A default practice of removal may be reinforced by the hate-speech
agreement’s requirement that the Tech Companies respond to reports of
hate speech within twenty-four hours.  Speed inevitably sacrifices thoughtful
deliberation.  The short deadline provides additional reason for removal to
become the default response to reported hate speech.135
Companies’ presumptive deletion of hate speech is bound to have a
global impact because TOS agreements are involved rather than court orders
or other forms of legal process.  TOS agreements are typically the same
across the globe.136  Thus, decisions to delete or block content as TOS viola-
tions mean content will be deleted or blocked everywhere the platform is
viewed.137
131 Id.
132 See id.
133 See Jeppesen, supra note 108.
134 Council of Europe Secretary General Concerned About Internet Censorship: Rules for Blocking
and Removal of Illegal Content Must Be Transparent and Proportionate, COUNCIL OF EUR. (June
1, 2016), https://www.coe.int/en/web/tbilisi/-/council-of-europe-secretary-general-con
cerned-about-internet-censorship-rules-for-blocking-and-removal-of-illegal-content-must-be-
transparent-and-prop.
135 See Jillian C. York, European Commission’s Hate Speech Deal with Companies Will Chill
Speech, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND (June 3, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/
06/european-commissions-hate-speech-deal-companies-will-chill-speech.
136 YouTube’s description of its terms of service is the same for inside the United States
as outside it. Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited
Oct. 26, 2017).  The same is true for Twitter: its description of its terms of service is the
same for inside the United States as outside it. The Twitter Rules, supra note 10.
137 Interview with Emma Llanso´, Director of Free Expression at the Center for Democ-
racy and Technology, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 15, 2017) (notes on file with author).
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Consider the different impact of a court order and a TOS violation.
Suppose France successfully prosecuted a poster for inciting violence against
Muslims.  With a court order in hand, French authorities could ask online
platforms to block the illegal hate speech.  The content would likely be
blocked from access in France and only in France.  But TOS violations pro-
ceed in a more systematic fashion.  Terms of service related to hateful and
extremist speech apply to the Tech Companies’ global operations.  Because
the hate-speech agreement is operationalized through terms of service, a pre-
sumption of removal would mean worldwide removal.
The industry database also has the potential to blacklist content across
the world.  Companies may feel pressure to remove hashed images that other
participants have designated as extremist expression in violation of terms of
service.138  If that were the case, the industry database could become a
“delete-it-all” program.139  Material included in the database might disappear
or never appear anywhere online.140
Although the current plan is for each participant to conduct an inde-
pendent review of flagged content, it may change as the Tech Companies
and future participants come to trust each other’s assessments.141  Given the
dominant market positions of the current participants and the likelihood
that companies will follow each other’s lead, terrorist content included in the
database would be invisible to most online users.  If a hash is treated as an
automatic reason to block content across the major platforms, then the con-
tent would effectively not exist.  Such censorship would be impossible to
“route[ ] around.”142
138 Id.
139 This is a paraphrase of Emma Llanso´’s comments about Conversation AI, an auto-
mated program designed to stop and delete harassing comments.  Andy Greenberg, Inside
Google’s Internet Justice League and Its AI-Powered War on Trolls, WIRED (Sept. 19, 2016), https:/
/www.wired.com/2016/09/inside-googles-internet-justice-league-ai-powered-war-trolls/.
My analysis focuses on content hosts, the top layer of the internet.  All of the concerns that
I raise in this piece take on greater significance the more power over speech that compa-
nies possess and the fewer the options available to consumers.
140 For an analogous phenomenon in the copyright field involving algorithmic match-
ing and filtering systems like YouTube’s Content ID, see Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors
and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499 (2017).
141 See Dangerous Precedent, Data Quality—Talking Tech w/ Emma Llanso´ & Aimee Rogstad
Guidera, CDT PODCAST (Dec. 19, 2016), https://soundcloud.com/cdt-tech-talk/dangerous-
precedent-data-quality-talking-tech-w-emma-llanso-aimee-rogstad-guidera.
142 John Perry Barlow, Censorship 2000, INTERNET SOC’Y, https://www.isoc.org/oti/arti-
cles/1000/barlow.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).  John Gilmore’s statement that “[t]he
Internet treats censorship as though it were a malfunction and routes around it” made
sense in 1992. See id.  Twenty years ago, there were no companies like Facebook, Google,
and Twitter dominating online attention.  Online platforms did not have hundreds of mil-
lions (let alone billions) of subscribers as do popular social media sites today.  Then, con-
tent blocked on one site could reappear on another site, and the number of potential
readers would not vary too much.  But today being blocked on the dominant platforms
would considerably change access to content.
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This will likely happen when smaller companies are given access to the
industry database.  Startups and other capital-constrained companies likely
lack the resources to conduct a review every time a hash is detected on their
services.143  They may be inclined to remove content included in the
database when it appears on their sites.144  Hashes would then operate as an
automatic ban for smaller platforms.
As the Center for Democracy and Technology’s Free Expression Direc-
tor Emma Llanso´ warns, the industry database “will become a target for gov-
ernments and private actors seeking to suppress speech across the web.”145  It
gives governments a single point of pressure that, if successful, would enable
the blocking of all types of disfavored content across the internet.  Scott
Shackford noted: “Once a tool can be used to censor, en masse, a violent
photo from some terrorist of the Islamic State, that tool can be used to cen-
sor anything in similar broad strokes.”146
3. Opacity
Compounding these concerns is the opacity of private speech practices.
Hateful or terrorist content is being removed outside of formal governmental
processes.147  When EU authorities file reports of hate speech under terms of
service, it is through a company’s complaint system rather than an adminis-
trative or judicial process.148  Unlike requests before an administrative or
judicial body, there are no official levers to find out that a government has
made the request.149
In recent years, the dominant online platforms have provided trans-
parency reports that let users know the number of formal requests made by
specific countries to take down content.150  But those transparency reports
may not fully capture governmental requests to remove hate speech or to add
violent extremist content to the shared industry database.  Because compa-
nies are being asked to remove hateful or extremist speech through their
private processes rather than governmental ones, there is no guarantee of
transparency.  As Part III addresses, those requests may fall outside voluntary
transparency efforts undertaken by tech companies.151
To be sure, when expression is removed from one of the major online
platforms, the author may find out and have a chance to appeal the decision
depending on the platform’s rules.  But if legitimate expression is included
143 Llanso´, supra note 123.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Shackford, supra note 63.
147 See, e.g., Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, OPEN RIGHTS GRP. WIKI, https://
wiki.openrightsgroup.org/wiki/Counter_Terrorism_Internet_Referral_Unit.
148 Id.
149 See id.
150 Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Vanished, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 137, 140–41
(2013).
151 See ACCESS NOW, supra note 108, at 15.
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in the shared database, its inclusion will be difficult, if not impossible, to
detect.  As Rebecca MacKinnon explained in her book The Consent of the
Networked, “Once websites get on [a censorship] list, it is difficult for them to
be removed, because the list itself is secret.”152
C. Risks
Censorship creep creates serious risks for global freedom of expres-
sion.153  Information may be removed even though it is essential for mean-
ingful public debate and thorough reporting of the news.154  Individuals
need to speak and listen to others to govern themselves.155  That includes the
ability to participate freely in all “forms of meaning-making and mutual influ-
ence.”156  As the editorial board of the Washington Post wrote in response to
social media companies’ removal of terrorist propaganda, “Citizens of every
country deserve to know what is going on in the world and what people at
both ends of the spectrum think about it—however hard that is to
stomach.”157
As human rights activist Aryeh Neier (who fled the Nazis with his parents
in 1939) has argued, “Freedom of speech itself serves as the best antidote to
the poisonous doctrines of those who try to promote hate.”158  The public
must be able to see or hear hateful or extremist views in order to interrogate
and counter those views.159  The expression of hateful or extremist ideas
enables society to assert strong social norms rejecting them.160  Those who
152 MACKINNON, supra note 23, at 97.
153 See Toor, supra note 39.  Depending on the context, the Tech Companies may block
or remove speech that would be reasonably understood as legal in most (if not all) coun-
tries; or they may block or remove speech that is legal in some countries but not in others.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the divergent treatment of hate
speech in the United States and the EU).
154 See Courtney C. Radsch, Privatizing Censorship in Fight Against Extremism Is Risk to Press
Freedom, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 16, 2015), https://cpj.org/blog/2015/10/
privatizing-censorship-in-fight-against-extremism-.php.
155 See Citron, supra note 6, at 191–92.
156 Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053,
1068 (2016); see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004); Jack M. Balkin, The
Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 438 (2009).
157 Editorial, The Government Wants Social Media Sites to Take Down Terrorist Propaganda.
Maybe They Shouldn’t, Wash. Post (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin
ions/the-government-wants-social-media-sites-to-take-down-terrorist-propaganda-maybe-
they-shouldnt/2016/09/16/148d75cc-7b77-11e6-ac8e-cf8e0dd91dc7_story.html?utm_term
=.ce571dc9b30e.
158 FLEMMING ROSE, THE TYRANNY OF SILENCE 85 (2014).
159 See Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of America,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 89 (1994).
160 C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY,
supra note 112, at 151.
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object to hateful or terrorist ideologies can explain and justify their
objections.161
Removal of hateful or terrorist speech on online platforms would under-
mine efforts designed to change people’s minds.162  For instance, Facebook
launched the Online Civil Courage Initiative to counter hate speech.163
Under the initiative, civil society groups are rewarded with advertising cred-
its, marketing resources, and support for countering hate speech online.164
According to Facebook’s COO Sheryl Sandberg, Facebook is convinced that
countering hate is a better way “to better understand and respond to the
challenges of extremist speech on the internet.”165
Similarly, Jigsaw, the Google-owned think tank, has developed a pro-
gram that uses a combination of Google’s advertising algorithms and You-
Tube’s video platform to identify aspiring ISIS recruits and to dissuade them
from joining the group.166  The program places advertising alongside results
for keywords and phrases commonly searched for by people attracted to
ISIS.167  The ads link to YouTube channels featuring videos that counter
ISIS’s brainwashing, such as testimonials from former extremists and imams
denouncing ISIS’s distortion of Islam.168  As Jigsaw’s Director of Research
and Development Yasmin Green has explained, the company is exploring
varied avenues to connect individuals with content countering violent ideolo-
gies, from ISIS to white supremacists.169  Twitter has partnered with People
Against Violent Extremism to support nongovernmental voices seeking to
counter extremist ideologies.170  The Dangerous Speech Project, led by
161 Id.
162 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that the remedy for bad speech is “more speech, not enforced silence”).
163 Dave Smith, Facebook Has Launched a New Campaign Against Hate Speech, BUS. INSIDER
(Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-online-civil-courage-initiative-
2016-1.
164 Online Civil Courage Initiative, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/Online
CivilCourage/about/?ref=page_internal (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
165 Smith, supra note 163.
166 Andy Greenberg, Google’s Clever Plan to Stop Aspiring ISIS Recruits, WIRED (Sept. 7,
2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/googles-clever-plan-stop-aspiring-isis-recruits/.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Lawfare Podcast: Disrupting ISIS Recruitment Online, LAWFARE (Sept. 10, 2016), https:/
/www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-disrupting-isis-recruitment-online.
170 Combating Violent Extremism, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016), https://blog.twitter.com/
2016/combating-violent-extremism.https://blog.twitter.com/2016/combating-violent-ex
tremism.
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Susan Benesch,171 is exploring ways for speech to counter hateful and
extremist views.172
Even if a majority of people embracing hateful ideas may not be open to
counterspeech, some may be.  For instance, online discussions were instru-
mental to Megan Phelps-Roper’s rejection of her family’s hateful ideology.173
In 2009, Phelps-Roper, a member of the Westboro Baptist Church, developed
a considerable following tweeting hateful views about LGBT individuals.174
Over time, she connected online with people who disagreed with her.  Some
of her online interlocutors pointed to the cruelty of her positions.175  Phelps-
Roper explained that her discussions on Twitter led her to reject the hateful
views of the Westboro Baptist Church.176  As she explained in her TED talk,
her friends on Twitter:
took the time to understand Westboro’s doctrines, and in doing so, they
were able to find inconsistencies I’d missed my entire life. . . . The truth is
that the care shown to me by these strangers on the internet was . . . evi-
dence that people on the other side were not the demons I’d been led to
believe.177
Those online conversations were “life-altering” for Phelps-Roper because
they helped her see that the members of her church were not the “ultimate
arbiters of divine truth but flawed human beings.”178  Her life’s work is now
speaking out against bigotry.179
171 Colby Itkowitz, This Professor Devotes Her Life to Countering Dangerous Speech. She Can’t
Ignore Donald Trump’s, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/inspired-life/wp/2016/10/24/this-professor-devotes-her-life-to-countering-danger-
ous-speech-she-cant-ignore-donald-trumps/?utm_term=.2e1a04be21fc.
172 See Twitter Safety (@TwitterSafety), TWITTER (June 13, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://twit
ter.com/twittersafety/status/874777139895181318 (“‘It’s our hope that counterspeech
can be a useful and tangible tool for diminishing harmful content online.’ - @SusanBen
esch #TSCS17.”).
173 See Adrian Chen, Unfollow, NEW YORKER (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2015/11/23/conversion-via-twitter-westboro-baptist-church-megan-phelps-
roper.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Megan Phelps-Roper, I Grew Up in the Westboro Baptist Church. Here’s Why I Left, TED
TALK (Feb. 2017), https://www.ted.com/talks/megan_phelps_roper_i_grew_up_in_the_
westboro_baptist_church_here_s_why_i_left?utm_campaign=social&utm_medium=referral
&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_content=talk&utm_term=global-social%20issues#t-6273
90.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Megan Phelps-Roper: If You’re Raised to Hate, Can You Still Reverse It?, TED RADIO HOUR
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/17/560181511/megan-phelps-roper-if-
youre-raised-to-hate-can-you-reverse-it.  Phelps-Roper serves on Twitter’s Trust and Safety
Council.  At the Trust and Safety Summit, she spoke with CEO Jack Dorsey about the
importance of counterspeech to changing her views.  Twitter Safety (@TwitterSafety),
Watch @Jack & @MeganPhelps Chat About Open & Empathetic Communication on Twitter, TWIT-
TER (May 2017), https://www.pscp.tv/w/1dRJZAOLjboGB.
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Phelps-Roper is not alone.  People have turned away from ISIS’s destruc-
tive ideology thanks to counterspeech.180  In a Brookings study entitled The
ISIS Twitter Census, J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan explain that “[w]hen
we segregate members of ISIS social networks, we are, to some extent, also
closing off potential exit ramps.”181
Another concern is that censorship creep will shut down discussions that
allow disaffected individuals to let off steam that might prevent them from
turning to violence.182  As noted by the United Nations General Assembly in
its Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, blocking online activity fuels
narratives of victimization and risks further isolating disaffected individu-
als.183  The risk is that aggrieved speakers will feel even more aggrieved and
more inclined to act on pent-up anger.184  Thus, removing extremist expres-
sion could “increase the speed and intensity of radicalization for those who
do manage to enter the network.”185
There are other costs beyond the realm of free expression.  Removal of
extremist speech may make it difficult for law enforcement to do its work.
Terrorism investigations often rely on clues left in social media activity.186
Thus, it may be difficult to investigate potential terrorism if online evidence
is immediately removed.
III. PROTECTING AGAINST CENSORSHIP CREEP
The hate-speech agreement and industry database are here to stay—
their dismantling in the near term is highly unlikely.  The EU will likely con-
tinue to demand more “voluntary” changes to coerce conformity with desired
speech norms.  For would-be state censors, “public-private partnerships” are
fruitful courses of action.  They secure the adoption of governmental prefer-
ences without the burden of formal process.  State actors enjoy the upside of
governmental power while avoiding the messiness of political debates and
180 J.M. BERGER & JONATHON MORGAN, THE ISIS TWITTER CENSUS 58 (2015), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.
pdf.
181 Id.
182 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“[The Framers knew] that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination;
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable govern-
ment; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”); Vin-
cent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 550.
183 Lucie Krahulcova, Europol’s Internet Referral Unit Risks Harming Rights and Feeding
Extremism, ACCESS NOW (June 17, 2016), https://www.accessnow.org/europols-internet-
referral-unit-risks-harming-rights-isolating-extremists/.
184 Baker, supra note 160, at 152.
185 BERGER & MORGAN, supra note 180, at 3.
186 See Jenna McLaughlin, The White House Asked Social Media Companies to Look for Ter-
rorists. Here’s Why They’d #Fail, INTERCEPT (Jan. 20, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/
01/20/the-white-house-asked-social-media-companies-to-look-for-terrorists-heres-why-theyd
-fail/.
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judicial hearings.  Private reporting processes also permit far greater censor-
ship than law would allow.  Platforms’ definitions of hate speech can be
stretched to cover all forms of disfavored content including political dissent.
EU regulators have no reason to depart from this approach given the success
of extralegal efforts.
Laws designed to check the potential for censorship creep are unlikely.
Rebecca MacKinnon put it well: “[C]orporate collusion in government sur-
veillance and censorship is unlikely to be solved by the passage and enforce-
ment of laws, even by the most well-intentioned and democratic of
governments.”187  Ultimately, Silicon Valley may be our best protection
against censorship creep.
As this Part outlines, tech companies should adopt special policies and
procedures to protect against governmental overreach.  The goal would be to
enhance the clarity, accountability, and transparency of censorship efforts.
Ombudsmen should be hired to check governmental attempts to suppress
newsworthy content.  These proposals are offered in hopes that executives
might view them as an effective way to contain EU censorship pressure and to
convey their support of users’ expression.
A. Definitions
Clarity in the definition, meaning, and application of the terms “hate
speech” and “terrorist material” would help contain censorship creep.  In
2011, Helen Norton and I argued that when companies ban hate speech,
they ought to explain precisely what the term means and why it has been
banned.188  In our view, users needed this information to understand their
rights and responsibilities when using platforms.189  Definitional clarity
serves another goal: preventing private hate-speech bans from being lever-
aged to silence legitimate expression.
Professor Norton and I laid out potential definitions for hate speech
based on principles of U.S. tort and civil rights law.190  For instance, hate
speech could be defined as that which threatens or encourages violence
against traditionally subordinated groups (or specific members of
groups).191  It could be defined as speech that intentionally inflicts emo-
tional distress—expression that is individually targeted, especially threaten-
ing or humiliating, repeated, and reliant on sensitive or outrageous
material.192  It could be defined as speech that would rise to the level of
187 MACKINNON, supra note 23, at 175.
188 Citron & Norton, supra note 7, at 1459.  In hopes that companies might find our
suggestions helpful, we presented our article at a meeting of the Anti-Cyber Hate Working
Group held at Stanford Law School in 2011.
189 See id. at 1457–58.
190 See id. at 1460–68.
191 See id. at 1461–62.
192 Id. at 1463.
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actionable workplace harassment under civil rights laws.193  Those defini-
tions, however, may be too narrow to satisfy EU regulators.
The Tech Companies could look to international human rights law for
guidance.194  The problem of ambiguity, however, would remain because
human rights law contains exceptionally flexible standards.195  Another pos-
sibility is to consult the work of the Council of Europe’s Secretary General
who is devising “common European standards [for hate speech and terrorist
material] to better protect freedom of expression online.”196  Those efforts
hopefully will provide definitions that curtail the malleability of those
terms.197
Human rights groups have expressed serious reservations about the
hate-speech agreement because hate speech is not well defined.  EU Justice
Commissioner Jourova´ responded to their objections by pointing to the EU
Framework Decision, European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, and
the law of member states.198  At the very least, companies should hold the
European Commission to that position and look to those sources in devising
their own definitions for hate speech and extremist material.
193 See id. at 1464–65.
194 See Scott Craig & Emma Llanso´, Pressuring Platforms to Censor Content Is Wrong
Approach to Combatting Terrorism, CDT BLOG (Nov. 5, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/pressur
ing-platforms-to-censor-content-is-wrong-approach-to-combatting-terrorism/ (arguing that
when government seeks to police speech, notably extremism, through terms of service,
those requests “should be grounded in legal frameworks rooted in international human
rights” rather than terms of service).
195 See Rose, supra note 158, at 150–51 (explaining that international law does not
embrace a universally accepted definition of hatred while member states generally define
hate speech as utterances expressing hatred or antipathy towards other social groups, a
standard that makes line drawing difficult if not impossible).  As Floyd Abrams explains in
his most recent book The Soul of the First Amendment, the European Court of Human Rights
has upheld hate-speech convictions involving criticism of politicians and bigoted views
expressed by politicians. ABRAMS, supra note 21, at 41–42.
196 Council of Europe Secretary General Concerned About Internet Censorship: Rules for Blocking
and Removal of Illegal Content Must Be Transparent and Proportionate, COUNCIL OF EUR. (June
1, 2016), https://www.coe.int/en/web/tbilisi/-/council-of-europe-secretary-general-con
cerned-about-internet-censorship-rules-for-blocking-and-removal-of-illegal-content-must-be-
transparent-and-prop.
197 See id.  The Secretary General remarked that while governments have an obligation
to combat the promotion of terrorism, hate speech, and other illegal online content,
I am concerned that some states are not clearly defining what constitutes
illegal content.  Decisions are often delegated to authorities who are given a wide
margin for interpreting content, potentially to the detriment of free expression.
On the basis of this study we will take a constructive approach and develop com-
mon European standards to better protect freedom of expression online.
Id.
198 Letter from Vera Jourova´, EU Justice Comm’r, to Jens-Henrik Jeppesen, Sec’y Gen.
of the Council of Eur. (June 21, 2016).  Commissioner Jourova´ has not adhered to this
definition in talking about the hate-speech agreement.  As Part I explained, she has sug-
gested that fake news, online radicalization, and terrorist propaganda should be removed
pursuant to the agreement.
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What about the industry database of banned terrorist content?  The laws
of EU member states provide little guidance because they are exceptionally
broad.199  The Tech Companies have said that they only intend to share
hashes of “the most extreme and egregious terrorist images and videos”—
“content most likely to violate all of our respective companies’ content poli-
cies.”200  Concerns about censorship creep can be tackled with policies that
explain precisely what the phrase “the most extreme and egregious terrorist
images and videos” means.  Policies should provide specific examples of con-
tent deserving of that designation.  Such clarity, explanations, and examples
can help prevent the gradual broadening of the standards governing what
content is included in the database.
As the Tech Companies work on their definitions of hate speech and
extremist material, they might consider including human rights groups as
well as academics in their efforts.201  Building on the work of the Anti-
Cyberhate Working Group202 and the Global Network Initiative,203 a multis-
takeholder group could be established to help companies articulate what
constitutes hate speech or terrorist material.  Civil liberties groups have
argued for a role in helping companies understand “the various meanings
given to ‘violent extremism’ and related concepts, and the potential impact
of ambiguity in this area on the promotion and protection of human
rights.”204
199 National laws differ as to what terrorist content is deemed unlawful and in what
contexts; some of those laws are so broad that they have been used to jail journalists, blog-
gers, and human rights defenders. See Letter from Judith Lichtenberg, Exec. Dir., Global
Network Initiative, to David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur, Office of the UN High Comm’r
for Human Rights (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/
PrivateSector/GlobalNetworkInitiative.pdf.
200 Clark, supra note 65.
201 See EUROPEAN DIG. RIGHTS, INPUT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PREVENTING AND COUN-
TERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (Mar. 18, 2016), https://edri.org/files/2016-UN-consultation
.pdf (criticizing the Europol Internet Referral Unit and other authorities that pressure
companies to remove terrorist or extremist content and thus allow states to regulate and
stifle online speech indirectly).
202 See Klonick, supra note 6, at 67.  For instance, the Anti-Cyber Hate Working Group,
of which I was a member, met annually, first at Stanford in 2012 and then in subsequent
years at tech companies. See Citron, supra note 6, at 232.  The goal was to devise best
practices for dealing with online abuse and hate speech. See ADL Releases “Best Practices” for
Challenging Cyberhate, ADL (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-
releases-best-practices-for-challenging-cyberhate.
203 The Global Network Initiative is a multistakeholder group made up of forty organi-
zations: technology companies, including Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!;
human rights groups, such as the Center for Democracy and Technology, Human Rights
Watch, and the Committee to Protect Journalists; free speech and privacy experts like Deir-
dre Mulligan and Rebecca MacKinnon; and others devoted to forging a common approach
to free expression and privacy online. See Participants, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https:/
/globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/index.php (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
204 UN HRC: Resolution on “Violent Extremism” Undermines Clarity, ARTICLE 19 (Oct. 8,
2015), https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38133/en/un-hrc:-resolution-
on-%E2%80%9Cviolent-extremism%E2%80%9D-undermines-clarity.
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Those definitions, designed for content moderators, should be shared
publicly so governments can understand the limits of efforts to remove
speech under TOS agreements.  With this knowledge, governments might be
less emboldened to push companies to broaden hate-speech or terrorism pol-
icies beyond recognition.  Some might even reconsider trying to silence
unpopular but protected expression.
B. Robust Accountability
Removal requests made by state authorities (or nongovernmental orga-
nizations acting on the state’s behalf) should be subject to rigorous review.
As a start, government officials should be required to identify themselves
when reporting content for TOS violations.  Online platforms must know
that they are dealing with governmental authorities or their surrogates.
There should be a separate reporting channel for government authorities
and any organization working on a state’s behalf.  For instance, Twitter has
“intake channels [dedicated] for law enforcement and other authorized
reporters” to file “legal requests.”205  That is a good start.  All removal
requests—“legal requests” and TOS reports—should proceed through that
channel.
What about the review process itself?  As Kate Klonick has documented
in her groundbreaking work,206 Facebook has extensive internal review
processes with detailed instructions about what content is banned and under
what circumstances.207  In-house employees or outside companies like Suth-
erland and Deloitte make decisions about content moderation on the com-
pany’s behalf.208  To ensure that terms of service are enforced uniformly,
moderators receive extensive training on the rules as well as on potential
cultural biases and emotional reactions.209
205 Removal Requests, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/en/removal-requests
.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).  The separate reporting channel applies to “legal
requests,” which includes court orders and formal requests from government agencies and
law enforcement. Id.
206 Klonick, supra note 6, at 43–57 (exploring the normative significance of a complex
knit of rules devised by platforms to govern the content moderation process).
207 In 2012, a version of Facebook’s instruction manual for reviewers was leaked online.
Danielle Citron, Actualizing Digital Citizenship with Transparent TOS Policies: Facebook Style,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 16, 2012), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/
03/actualizing-digital-citizenship-with-transparent-tos-policies-facebooks-leaked-policies.ht
ml/comment-page-1.  As Kate Klonick shows, since that time, Facebook has developed
even more extensive and detailed instructions for individuals reviewing abuse complaints.
Klonick, supra note 6, at 41; see Julia Angwin, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules Protect White
Men from Hate Speech but Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA (June 28, 2017), https://www.pro
publica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-algorithms.
Those instructions could be revised with special instructions for removal requests made by
government actors.
208 See Klonick, supra note 6, at 49 (discussing the different tiers of moderators in the
escalation process).
209 See id. at 51–53.
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Other online platforms approach content moderation in a similarly care-
ful way.  As part of that process, all companies should ensure that govern-
ment requests are viewed through a special lens.  When government
authorities seek to suppress speech under terms of service, content modera-
tors should view requests with a presumption against removal, or at least a
healthy dose of skepticism.210  Content moderators should receive training
about censorship creep, including past and present governmental efforts to
silence critics.  Training should focus on how to distinguish banned hate
speech or terrorist material from newsworthy content.  This is not an easy
task but crucial nonetheless.
Decisions related to government requests should be accompanied by an
explanation—decisionmakers who have to articulate their reasons are likely
to think more carefully about their decisions.211  When a moderator decides
to grant a government request for removal based on a TOS violation, that
decision should automatically pass through a second layer of review.  Individ-
uals whose speech is removed should be notified about the removal and
given a chance to appeal.212
The hate-speech agreement’s requirement that the Tech Companies
resolve reports within twenty-four hours will make it difficult and expensive
to implement additional layers of review.  With well-trained moderators,
detailed policies, and a presumption against removal, timeliness may become
less of a problem.
The actual decisions, of course, may provoke the ire of the European
Commission.  The European Commission will not be pleased if removal
requests are not granted, much as the recent review suggested.  That tension
will remain until the Tech Companies and European users can convey to the
Commissioners and lawmakers their concerns about free expression, much
as Apple did in the recent encryption debate in the United States.  If human
rights groups were given the ability to act as advisers and watchdogs, then
they could help explain to the public the real risks of censorship creep.
What about the industry database of banned violent extremist content?
As the previous Part explored, the industry database could become a black-
list.  Once included in the database, content may never end up appearing on
any of the major platforms.  Inclusion in the database has greater potential to
systematically silence speech than individual requests to remove content
under terms of service.  As a result, strong protections are essential to prevent
governments from coopting the database.
210 Written Comments of Article 19 on the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/28 (May 11,
2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/PrivateSector/Article19.
pdf.
211 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1302
(2008).
212 The dominant online platforms do just that for decisions resulting in the removal of
speech.  Many provide an appeals-like process so users can present their objections.
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One option is for companies to adopt a blanket rule that governments
cannot contribute hashes to the database.  As Emma Llanso´ argues, the Tech
Companies should “[c]learly and unequivocally state that under no circum-
stances will [they] accept a contribution of a hash by someone acting on
behalf of a government.”213  To avoid efforts to undermine that ban, they
could announce any effort or request from a government to undermine that
policy.214  Another alternative is for companies to subject a government
request to several layers of review and to condition the submission on the
approval of senior staff.215  Rigorous accountability can help prevent system-
atizing censorship of legitimate speech at the behest of European govern-
ments and other nations.
C. Meaningful Transparency
Another check on censorship creep is for companies to provide detailed
reports on governmental efforts to censor hate speech and extremist material
through informal measures.  Transparency reports enable public conversa-
tion about censorship.  In turn, European users can contact lawmakers with
concerns about attempts to use tech companies as censorship proxies.  The
more users find out about companies’ efforts to protect their fundamental
freedoms, the more trust users will have in online providers.216  Human
rights advocates can call attention to concerns about censorship creep.  Ulti-
mately, transparency reports can generate “productive discussion about the
appropriate use and limits of [state] authority.”217
The Electronic Frontier Foundation began tracking the extent to which
companies were being transparent about how often they are blocking or
removing content or accounts in 2015.  At that time, Google was the only
tech company providing transparency reports.218  Since then, many more
platforms have endeavored to provide some transparency about government
requests to suppress speech.  Reviewing the successful features of current
efforts can help formulate a path forward.
Twitter has been hailed for its transparency efforts, and rightfully so.
The company’s 2016 Transparency Report details the number of legal
requests for content removal based on country.219  Crucially, and uniquely, it
213 Llanso´, supra note 123.
214 See id.
215 See id.
216 For work on the importance of trust in companies’ respect for privacy and expres-
sion, see Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog’s important scholarship including Taking
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016), and Privacy’s Trust Gap: A
Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017) (reviewing FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUS-
CATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR PRIVACY AND PROTEST (2015)).
217 Liane Lovitt, Why Transparency Reports Matter Now More than Ever, MEDIUM (May 13,
2016), https://medium.com/inflection-points/why-transparency-reports-matter-now-
more-than-ever-9fb6ebe733fa#.yhossoi1q.
218 Thanks to Daphne Keller for pointing this out to me.
219 See Removal Requests, supra note 205.
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discloses the number of government requests seeking removal of terrorism
content for TOS violations.220  Twitter is “actively working to expand” its
reporting of all “known, non-legal government TOS requests . . . through
[its] standard . . . intake channels, such as requests to remove impersonating
accounts and other content that violates our Rules against abuse.”221
Although Facebook’s 2016 Transparency Report provided important infor-
mation to users, it did not include the number of government requests seek-
ing removal of content based on its terms of service and community
standards.222
Much as Twitter has done for terrorist content and expects to do far
more of in the future, corporate transparency reports should detail the num-
ber, subject matter, and results of all government requests to remove content
for TOS violations.223  If governments are allowed to request the addition of
hashes to the industry database, transparency reports should include details
about those requests.  Although transparency cannot solve the problem of
censorship creep, it can help contain it, especially if strong standards and
robust accountability procedures are adopted.
D. Ombudsmen
An acute problem related to censorship creep is its potential to suppress
newsworthy content.  Government removal requests may seek to remove ter-
rorist or hateful content whose publication is in the public’s interest.  To
address this concern, companies should consider hiring or consulting
220 Government TOS Reports, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/en/gov-tos-
reports.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (reporting that in the six-month period from July
2016 to December 2016, Twitter received 716 reports from governments related to 5929
accounts and that 85% were removed for TOS violations related to violent extremism).
221 Id. In its 2016 Transparency Report, Microsoft revealed the number of requests
made by countries for the removal of content based on local laws or TOS violations and
the percentage that were granted. Content Removal Requests Report, MICROSOFT, https://
www.microsoft.com/en-us/about/corporate-responsibility/crrr (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
It did not, however, tease out formal from informal requests as Twitter did.
222 See Government Requests Report: FAQs, FACEBOOK, https://govtrequests.facebook.com/
faq/.  But Facebook’s 2016 Transparency Report did helpfully provide examples of govern-
mental requests to remove content under local laws and its response.  For instance, France
asked Facebook to remove a photograph depicting victims of the terrorist attack at the
Bataclan concert hall.  As the report explained, the photo did not violate Facebook’s com-
munity standards, but because it violated French law, access to the photo was blocked in
France. Id.
223 See FREEDOM ONLINE COALITION, SUBMISSION TO UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR DAVID
KAYE: STUDY ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(2016), https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/FOC-
WG3-Submission_ICT-Sector-Report.pdf.  Some countries like China do not allow trans-
parency reporting. See RANKING DIGITAL RIGHTS, SUBMISSION TO UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
DAVID KAYE: STUDY ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE DIGITAL
AGE (2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/PrivateSector/Rank-
ingDigitalRightsAndNewAmerica.pdf.
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ombudsmen whose life’s work is the newsgathering process.224
Ombudsmen, who are also known as public editors, work to “protect press
freedom” and to promote “high-quality journalism.”225  Their role is to
“act[ ] in the best interests of news consumers.”226
Ombudsmen should have a special role in assessing government removal
requests made through informal channels like terms of service or the indus-
try database.  They can help identify requests that would remove material
that is important for public debate and knowledge.  Then too, because the
industry database raises special concerns about the suppression of expres-
sion, the ombudsman could review all contributions to the database with the
public interest in mind.227
E. Geographically Tailored TOS
Might tech companies limit the impact of EU pressure by refusing to
incorporate EU norms into terms of service?  Companies could tailor terms
of service and community guidelines to specific countries and regions.  This
would map speech norms onto countries and regions rather than imposing a
one-size-fits-all model across the globe.
Policies that balkanize online practices do run the risk of endangering
the free flow of information.  Consider the impact of laws that require com-
panies to store data collected from a country’s citizens within its borders.
Data localization laws, as they are known, bring all online interactions under
the control of local governments, which is especially troubling in the case of
authoritarian regimes.228  Iran’s data localization law is viewed as a tool for
the government to stifle dissent.229
Tailoring terms of service by country or region does risk curtailing free
expression.  But it would also have an important upside.  It would prevent the
removal or blocking of speech in more speech-protective countries while
allowing the removal or blocking of speech in countries with more restrictive
speech norms.230
224 See About ONO, ONO, http://newsombudsmen.org/about-ono (last visited Jan. 8,
2018).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 The database should be accessible to and analyzed by independent experts familiar
with free expression and policy. See Jeppesen, supra note 108.
228 See ANUPAM CHANDER & UYEˆN P. LEˆ, BREAKING THE WEB: DATA LOCALIZATION VS. THE
GLOBAL INTERNET 46–47 (2014), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0b70/1f2601ff39bc338
dc351e5c8a6a40f98f304.pdf.
229 Id. at 47.
230 My analysis in this Article focuses on content hosts, the top layer of the internet.
The concerns that I raise in this piece take on even greater significance the more power
over speech that companies possess and the fewer the options available to consumers.  This
is certainly true of internet service providers and domain name registrars among other
layers in the internet stack.  This is true of companies like Cloudflare whose services are
indispensable for remaining online. See Kate Klonick, Opinion, The Terrifying Power of
Internet Censors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/opin
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CONCLUSION
Silicon Valley has a long history of embracing American-style speech
norms.  For more than a decade, when social media platforms admitted
exceptions to the notion that information should be free, they were careful
to ensure that those exceptions remained narrow.  This was true whether the
issue was impersonation, stalking, or nonconsensual pornography.  Free
expression has long been embedded in tech companies’ corporate culture.
In the wake of recent terror attacks and the resurgence of hate groups,
European regulators have pressured tech companies to change their speech
rules and practices to remove extremist material appearing on their plat-
forms.  Some of the resulting changes may do some good.  After all, an indus-
try database that flags for removal videos containing “kill lists” or bomb
instructions may ultimately prevent violence.  The hate-speech agreement
could lead to the rapid removal of posts calling for the death of religious
minorities, which, if left up, could inspire physical violence on members of
those groups.
But the changes to private rules and practices should be understood and
evaluated for what they are: compelled conformity with European speech
norms.  Despite the protestations of EU regulators, they are neither voluntary
nor the product of meaningful public-private partnerships.  Instead, they are
the result of government coercion occurring outside the rule of law.  What is
different about the pressure from states now is that it has brought about
changes that risk worldwide censorship creep.  Because governments are
using terms of service to achieve their ends, the resulting suppression of
speech will be global.
This Article offers potential safeguards to prevent censorship creep.
Companies can and should adopt prophylactic protections designed to man-
age extralegal pressure for the good of free expression.  Greater clarity,
accountability, transparency, and oversight would help check EU efforts to
censor speech on a global scale.  As companies assess these suggestions, a
multistakeholder approach could provide crucial expertise to tech compa-
nies as they develop processes to resist censorship creep while combating the
real perils of hate speech and extremist material.  A “solution—conceived of
and imposed primarily by some combination of government and corpora-
tions—will likely . . . be inadequate to deal with the complex issues raised by
the problem of extremist use of social media.”231  It should include experts
in extremism and hate, victims of extremist violence, scholars of political dis-
ion/cloudflare-daily-stormer-charlottesville.html?mcubz=3&_r=0 (discussing Cloudflare’s
refusal to provide its security services to neo-Nazi website Daily Stormer in the wake of the
armed white supremacist rally in Charlottesville and murder of counterprotestor Heather
Heyer).  Neil Richards and I will be exploring concerns about power and digital speech in
an article entitled Essential Preconditions for Free Expression in the Digital Age, 95 WASH. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018).  Thanks to Michael Nelson for discussing these concerns with
me at the CATO Free Expression symposium.
231 BERGER & MORGAN, supra note 180, at 61.
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sent, and civil rights and civil liberties organizations.232  It would deepen the
efforts of companies, such as Facebook, which is bringing counterterrorism
expertise in house,233 and Twitter, whose Trust and Safety Council provides
advice on potential proposals concerning online abuse.234
As Apple’s struggle with the U.S. government over encryption illustrated
and as Silicon Valley’s unanimous support for that stand reaffirmed, tech
companies enjoy public support when they defend fundamental freedoms.
The suggestions outlined in this piece thus may be positively received.
232 Id.
233 Curt Mills, Facebook Is Looking for a Counterterrorism Analyst, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2016-11-14/face
book-is-looking-for-a-counterterrorism-analyst.
234 The Twitter Trust and Safety Council, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/safety/
council (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
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